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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of collective action has been discussed by
Political Scientists, Economists, sociologists and psychologists
for almost 30 years. Since Olson (1965), it has been taken for
granted that there is a clear disincentive for the potential
beneficiaries to contribute the time, money or other resources
necessary for the group effort to be successful, even if all want
that effort to be successful. Because they cannot be excluded
from being enjoying the results of collective action. This is
social dilemma (Dawes 1980; Messick and Brewer 1983; Hardin 1971;
Sell 1988; Sell and Wilson 1989). One-shot PD game captures this
dilemma situation of public good provision: free-riding problem.1
Contemporary game theory, however, indicates that iteration,
even finite iteration, and retaliatory strategies are expected to
resolve "social dilemmas" (Taylor 1987; Friedman 1986; Raub 1988;
Bianco and Bates 1990; Kreps, Milgrom and Wilson 1982). That is,
the trigger or TFT strategies - both effective (in the sense that
a player cannot improve the payoff by deviating from cooperation,
given that this deviation "triggers" punishment) and credible (in
the sense that the players are willing to carry out their
threatened punishment if any one defects) - must be subgame-
perfect to sustain cooperation in an iterated game, if discount
parameter is large enough in relation to the temptation to
1
 Social dilemma situations are also explained by other games
such as a Assurance Game (Runge 1984), a Chicken Game (Taylor
1987), and Volunteers' Dilemma Game (Diekmann 1985).
defect.2 But, this formal theory still have some problem. As
Folk theorem shows, cooperation is only one of the infinite
number of equilibrium, and more important, full defection is a
sub-game perfect equilibrium regardless of the discount rate and
the temptation to defect (Bianco and Bates 1990; Axelrod 1981).
In other words, it can be proven that no one have an incentive to
deviate at some points (equilibria), but we cannot tell how an
equilibrium point is actually selected from several equilibria.
In this respect, we can say that the problem of providing public
goods by securing cooperation is one of getting to cooperation in
the first place.
In the real world, we have seen many cases where public
goods are provided voluntarily by long-enduring, self-organized
and self-governed collective action (Ostrom 1990). Korean rural
development movement in 1970's, called Saemaul Undong (means New
Village Movement), may be thought of as one of these cases. Many
studies empirically show that Korean farmers did contribute, both
actively and voluntarily, to the provision of public goods,
especially infrastructure (Park 1979; Kim 1985; Whang 1981;
Uphoff 1980; Steinberg 1984). Their cooperation was successful
in 1970's, but not so successful in 1980's. In this paper, I
will see what makes collective actions among Korean farmers to be
initiated and sustained in 1970's, and what makes them
unsuccessful in 1980's. Especially, I will focus on the rule
configuration of Saemaul Undong and government's affects on it.
II.SAEMAUL UNDONG
1. Background:
Korea's rural sector had suffered from official neglect
prior to the 1970's. Officials had little enthusiasm for program
promoting agricultural innovation, and market arrangement
generally worked to the farmers' disadvantage. The government's
emphasis was on urban policies. As a result,
agriculture had rarely been very profitable; at times
it has barely reached even subsistence levels ... low prices
of agricultural products [were] compared poorly with the
prices of manufactured goods the farmers purchased ... the
lack of rural roads complicated nearly every farm chore and
discharged the farmers from using agricultural machinery
(Kim 1985, 324).
In the early 1970's executive attention turned to the
imbalance between urban and rural Korea (KOIS 1977; Park 1979).
President Chung-Hee Park, "son of the poor farmer" in his own
expression, believed that spontaneous self-help efforts could
produce striking transformation in the quality of rural life, and
proposed a strategy: rural development through cooperative
village self-reliance (KIOS 1977; Park 1979; Kim 1985).3 That
Some scholars argue that the basic motive was political one.
According to them, the ruling party led by him was based on the
popular vote of rural farmers, while the opposition party was based
on the support of the urban sector. In 1970, he needed more solid
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was the Saemaul Undong. The essence of it was to promote
cooperative development efforts by villagers, guided by competent
and highly motivated village leaders (called Saemaul leader) with
government aid through technical and financial assistance and the
training of the Saemaul leaders.
2. Historical Overview:
(1) 1971-74; This was the period of (i) building Saemaul
institutional arrangements within government organizations and at
local level; and (ii) the Saemaul experiment (Rondinelli 1983).
Saemaul Undong Consultive Council was established and
organizations patterned after it were set up at each level of
local administration: Province (do), County (kun), township
(myon), and Village (maul).4 National government offered all
villages a limited amount of building materials with which to
launch small self-help projects such as common well and roads.
Of 35,000 villages, one-third of them responded positively
(Rondinelli 1983). It made government to recognize that rural
development cannot be achieved simply by the maximum influx of
resources into rural communities without the proper response or
supports from rural sector, and the Saemaul Undong was one of ways
of doing that job (see Whang 1981, ch.4).
4
 At that time, there already existed one institution for
rural development called National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation (NACF). But, unlike its name, it was nothing more than
a government agency from which the poor could not receive good
services. It had nothing to do with the success of Saemaul Undong,
and it was "nothing more than the agent for the fertilizer company"
(Chang 1987).
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broadly based community initiative of rural people (Whang 1981).
On the basis of this experience, Saemaul Undong has since focused
on encouragement of village initiatives and concentrated its
supports on those villages that display the will and the
competence to carry out development project in accordance with
the program's ideals of self-reliance and cooperation. Notice
that, in this period, a system for village classification which
decide the level of government support (it will be explained in
ch.3) and Saemaul Leaders Training Institute were established.
(2) 1974-76; This stage aimed at improving rural living
standards and rural infrastructures -houses, roads, drainage,
mountain woodlands, electrification and running water supply
(Park 1979; Kim 1985). More important, village-level informal
organizations, including Women's Leagues and Youth Clubs, were
recognized and encouraged by the government. It was believed
that informal ties between villagers were critical in sustaining
cooperative efforts (Yu et al. 1980).
(3) 1977-79; This stage had been concerned with reinforcing
self-help incentives other than government's supports. By 1977,
Korea achieved self-sufficiency in food and the gap between rural
and urban sectors were reduced, and agricultural policy began to
be changed, according to these success of Saemaul Undong.
Unassisted, spontaneous development efforts were emphasized.
Villages were encouraged to accumulate capital by designing and
managing project independently. Further, the government allowed
the import of agricultural products and started to freeze
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government purchase prices of major grains (Kim 1988). Given the
fact that the cost of producing rice, wheat, corn, or soybeans in
Korea range from two to five times that in the United States
(Steinberg 1984, D-19), Korean farmers cannot compete with
imported agricultural products. Moreover, considering annual
inflation rate, freezing government purchase price means actual
decrease in prices of major agricultural products, in turn, the
substantial decrease in farmers' income.
(4) From 1980 onward; After change in Administration in
1980, Korean new President, Doo-Whan Chun, proclaimed that
Saemaul Undong should be revitalized (Republic of Korea, 1984).
Under the flag of civil stewardship and revitalization of Saemaul
Undong, as a result, Saemaul Undong Central Consultive Council
was changed to Headquarter of Saemaul Undong. The total amount
of budget of it was almost doubled compared to Park
Administration, and the total capital which was publicly known
was almost US $ 70 million by the end of 1985 (Kim 1988). It was
called even "the 4th Branch of the Government" or "the
untouchable". But, it failed to revitalize the Saemaul Undong.
More precisely, it turned out that it was used politically.5
After the change of Administration, the president of the
Headquarter of Saemaul Undong, the younger brother of ex-
President Chun, was sentenced to imprisonment for corruption and
5It is publicly known that the Headquarter of Saemaul Undong
forced big companies to donate political fund called "Saemaul
Donation". Under the name of civil stewardship, it could receive
government support without being under the control of formal audit
process.
misuse of power (Yoon 1987).
Now, Korean farmers suffer from extreme poverty. The ratio
of income from farming to cost of living, which used to be 120%
in the middle of 1970's and 90% in 1980, is below 70% (Kim 1987).
Considering the absence of alternative employment opportunity in
the rural community (Kim 1985; Chung 1987; Ko, Lim and Joo 1979),
it means that most Korean farmers have debts (Kim 1986). In
1988, the national total of Korean farmers' debt was about US $
5.7 billion, and it was 35% of the national total of the farmers'
income (Kim 1988).
In the following chapters, I will examine the causes of the
success and failure of Saemaul Undong, the rule configuration and
its relationship to the success and failure, in game theoretic
term.
III. SAEMAUL UNDONG AS A GAME
1. Saemaul Undong as a Repeated Game:
Saemaul Undong can be thought of as a game. Participation
in the Saemaul Undong was totally based on volition. Rural
villagers' participation was the result of their strategic
choice. There was no legal basis by which rural villagers could
be enforced (Whang 1981). Further, Saemaul Undong can be
regarded as a repeated game, on the basis of the facts that (i)
most Saemaul projects have required more than 1 round of
cooperation in achieving the goal of the projects; and (ii) a
great number of projects are required to achieve the ultimate
goal of the Saemaul movement: eventual reduction of rural poverty
and employment as well as the improvement in income and standard
of living in rural life. Based on this assumption, I will build
a model with which we might explain the success and failure of
Saemaul Undong. The model is like the following:
Let one day cooperation be
In the rest of this chapter, I will examine rules-in-use and
government's influence on them.
2. Rules-in-use:
A set of working rules can be defined as institutions:
[Which] are used to determine who is eligible to make
decision in some arena, what actions are allowed or
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what
procedures must be followed, what information must or must
not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to
individual dependent on their actions (Ostrom 1990, 76;
1986).
These rules, then, influences the actions of individuals and
outcomes of the game. Furthermore, these working rules are
affected by the choices made within a set of collective choice
rules that are themselves made within a set of constitutional
choice rules (Ostrom 1990, 76). In addition, physical world, as
well as the attribute of community where the game is played, also
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either directly or indirectly affect the action situation.
Finding out all these factors mentioned above, I think we can
explain both success and failure of Saemaul movement.
(1) Position rule; It specifies a set of positions and how
many participants are to hold each position. We can think of
several positions such as Saemaul leaders, members of Village
Development Committee, Village General Meeting and informal
village organization (Kim 1985; Rho 1977; Park 1974). There were
two Saemaul leaders in each village (one is male and the other is
female). Village Development Committee was generally composed of
15-20 elder and influential villagers. Village General Meeting
was composed of the whole villagers. And Informal village
organizations were composed of several villagers who shared
something common. Government formally recognizes all village
level organizations including informal village organizations and,
especially, tries to encourage farmers to form as many informal
organizations as possible, in order to take use of family and
kinship ties in implementing Saemaul Undong (Whang 1983).
(2) Boundary rule; It specifies how the game selects
players to hold or leave these positions. Players refer to the
farmers who live in rural village and engage in farming. There
were about 35,000 villages in Korea in 1970's (Park 1979; KIOS
1977) , and villages were composed of 25 to 75 houses (Kim 1985)
or about 80 farmers on average (Park 1979). It is the
government's policy to narrow the boundary of Saemaul Undong to
village (maul) rather than township (myon) - the lowest formal
administration unit (Whang 1981). The underlying reason for this
policy is, probably, it is found from the experimental projects
that cooperative efforts are likely to be sustained better by the
small-scale and informal communities, village, than larger and
formal administrative units.
Saemaul leaders must be an inhabitant in the village (Kim
1985). They are chosen by villagers. Anyone over 20 years old,
regardless of education, income or social status, who was chosen
by his neighbors, could become a Saemaul leader (Rondinelli
1983). But, actually, most Saemaul leaders are older than 40,
experienced, influential and highly motivated people in the
village (Park 1974). The members of Village Development
Committee are usually the seniors of the village respected by the
villagers and elected in the Village General Meeting. Any one
who lives in the village automatically becomes the member of the
Village General Meeting and the informal village organizations
(if he/she shares common interests with some organization).
(3) Authority rule: It specifies which set of actions or
strategies are assigned to which position at each round of the
game. Saemaul leaders are supposed to initiate village
development project and promote cooperation among neighbors.
But, we must remember that there is no formally prescribed
authority for Saemaul leaders, even though the government
provides formal training to the Saemaul leaders and publicize the
success story of outstanding Saemaul leaders. Unlike Bianco and
Bates's leader (1990), they have no control over the distribution
10
of the benefits of collective actions. They are simply farmers
who are willing to serve as a Saemaul leader in spare time.
Similarly, Village Development Committee has no formal authority,
and it is shown that they contributed almost nothing to the
success of Saemaul Undong(Aqua 1974). We can say that the
farmers examine possible projects among the government's program
package and approve Saemaul leaders proposal for implementing
projects and draft a village development plan in the Village
General Meeting (Kim 1985). In sum, I think we can say that
there is actually two position in the game; Saemaul leaders and
the farmers. In game theoretic sense, however, their strategic
variables are identical: the level of cooperation. Let these
strategies be:
Of Saemaul leaders, 85.2% was farmers; 92% had lived in
their village since their grand parents' generation; 83.4% said
that they do this job because they devoted for their village. Of
villagers, about 47% thought that Saemaul leader is a very
rewarding job and 30% said that it's worth trying once (Whang
1983).
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cooperate as long as others cooperate. In addition, I assume
that there may be some people who always defect because they
share nothing with other villagers. Formally,
(4) Aggregation rule: It specifies the decision function to
map actions into intermediate or final outcomes. We can think of
several aggregation rules. First, as mentioned before, Saemaul
leaders propose village development project. This projects,
then, must be approved by the consensus of all villagers. The
next round of the game is implementation. In implementation
process, villagers can decide their strategies, the level of
cooperation, at each round. And, their strategies are
conditional on the aggregated outcome of the previous round
decided by others' actions. The aggregation used in this process
is, I conjecture, summarizes in terms of n which appears in Bn: n = N - (1+K), where k > 0. It means that Korean farmers know the
12
The meaning of K is "the degree of forgiveness (Bender 1988)
or tolerance (Ostrom 1990)". When k = 0, it means that strategy
is not "forgiving" or ignores some stochastic error or noise.
When K > 0, it means that strategy is "forgiving" to some extent.
In other words, villagers regard the deviation of K people as not
what they really wanted to do, but the unintended results come
form the uncontrollable factors (Bender 1988). Villagers usually
understand some personal difficulties of their neighbors such as
poverty, illness (Yu et al. 1980; Yu 1980). Unlike Taylor's
argument (1989), villagers have no incentive to be in K people
group (i.e., an incentive to free-riding). It is probably
because (i) extended-family-like attribute of village makes it
easy and almost costless to monitor the villagers; and (ii) F-
connection between villagers (Ben-Porath 1980) internalize norms
of not free-riding. What is noticeable is that the government
tries to reinforce informal-ties by recognizing and encouraging
informal village organizations in order to affect implementing
aggregation rule by influencing K.
Next, at the end of each project, the outcome of collective
action is evaluated by the government, based on the village
classification system (KIOS 1977; Rondinelli 1983; Kim 1985).
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That is, the villages are classified into three categories: base-
line, self-helped, and self-sufficient. Then, the cooperative
efforts of each village are compared to the government's
criteria, which differs across the three categories of villages.
The principle of "the better village, the first support" is an
effective stimulator of people's motivation (Whang 1983). Based
on the fact, let the aggregated outcome of the project composed
of a iteration of cooperation be:
Using this Village Classification System, therefore, government
can influence the game.
(5) Information Rule : It specifies the kind of information
available to each position at each node. At the first node,
Saemaul leaders can access to necessary information and
technology, and the potential payoffs through the formal Saemaul
leader training offered by the government (KIOS 1977; Rondinelli
1983) . Knowing what is the best strategy and discussion about it
can increase the possibility of cooperation among the players
(Ostrom and Walker 1989). In our case, Saemaul leaders mainly
concentrate their efforts on informing their neighbors of what is
the best strategy (Park 1974). The farmers, therefore, have
sufficient information about how their actions are related to the
14
aggregated outcomes, what is their payoff, and the technical
details of the projects. In addition, they can know others'
previous actions and the exact number of people who choose a
specific strategy (i.e., NB, NC, ND, where NI means the number of
people whose strategy is I) . The government provided formal
training for Saemaul leaders and publishes monthly magazine
Saemaul to encourage Saemaul leaders and enlighten farmers (KIOS
1977; Park 1974; Republic of Korea 1984).
(6) Payoff Rule : It specifies how benefits and costs are
required. Farmers are required to invest their voluntary, unpaid
labor and sometimes, capitals. The benefits of infrastructure
usually cannot be withdrawn from the defectors, whereas the costs
of providing them are paid by the cooperators. The government
also provides supports. The government's supports are usually
30% of the total costs of projects (Whang 1981). But, as
mentioned before, the amount of the government's support is
determined by the result of the previous projects and the village
classification the village belongs to. Based on these facts, I
assume that payoffs for an individual farmer who use Bn and
cooperates is:
m = N-ND-K.
Payoff for an individual farmer who use Bn and defect is:
The payoff for the Saemaul leaders are almost same as that
of their neighbors except that there are some non-monetary
rewards (Rondinelli 1983; KIOS 1977; Park 1974). Successful and
dedicated Saemaul leaders receive Saemaul Orders of Merit and
other medals from President Park. Stories of selected successful
village Saemaul leaders are widely publicized through mass media.
Most of Saemaul leaders regard their positions as a honor and
feel that they are respected by their neighbors (Park 1974; Whang
1983). Without these awards, it would be difficult to find
motivated people to serve as Saemaul leader (Rondinelli 1983;
Aqua 1974).
(7) Scope Rule : It specifies the set of outcomes that may
be affected. Farmers can change the implementing aggregation
rules by changing K, the development benefit of project T, DBT,
and the amount of the agricultural products. More important,
most parameters are beyond the reach of the farmers. Village
boundary, Village classification criteria, DBG* , proportion of
the government's support, , and the government purchase price of
the agricultural product, p, all of these important parameters
are decided by the government, and farmers have no formal way to
be involved in deciding these parameters.
3. Policy Implications
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So far, we have seen operational rules-in-use. As we saw,
the government provided incentives to promote voluntary provision
of rural infrastructure. Even though Saemaul Undong was
initiated and planned by the central government (Aqua 1974), the
main cause of the early success of Saemaul Undong was voluntary
cooperation of the farmers. The government knew this fact, and
took advantage of it (Whang 1981). The government provided
training for Saemaul leaders, informed farmers of necessary
information and best strategies, recognized and encouraged
informal village organizations, and affected payoff functions
through parameters such as DBG*, , and p in order to offer
incentive structures for the farmers. As a result, they changed
the incentive structure of the game.
Here, let me briefly examine the relation between several
parameters including proportion of government's support, 6,
discount parameter, i, and the temptation to defect, i*.
First, For simplicity, let
17
This inequality implies that government support rate is
related to the production coefficient, individual share of
development cost, and the attributes of the target community
denoted by K and i. In other words, if government can know
those parameters mentioned just before, government support rate
can be an efficient policy tool. Also, we can know that (i) as , i, and NB increase, can be smaller without decreasing the
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possibility that cooperation can be an equilibrium; and (ii) as
K, DCT increase, we need large S to ensure the equilibrium of
cooperation.
What is noticeable is that if government can assume some
problematic situation as a repeated game and can know the
parameters mentioned above, government can achieve policy
objectives with less cost than if it cannot. Like this, the
government can affect the outcome of the game and the equilibrium
by changing both and DBG*, and the effectiveness of the government's policy is dependent on , DCT, NB, and K.
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Design Principle:
Ostrom suggests Design Principle which is commonly found in
robust CPR organizations (1990. ch.3). Even though our case is
provision of infrastructure which is different from CPR
situation, I think, this principles will be helpful in
understanding Saemaul Undong. In general, Saemaul Undong
satisfies most design principles except two. It has clearly
defined boundary (principle 1: clearly defined boundary). Most
rules-in-use are congruent with local condition (principle 2:
congruence between rules and local conditions). Village
Classification System enables congruence between rules-in-use and
local conditions. Moreover, the boundary, village, combined with
rules-in-use, facilitates cooperation among players. Villagers
can meet, discuss about Saemaul projects and modify rules-in-use
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in the Village General Meeting (principle 3: collective choice
arrangement). And It also plays a role as a Conflict resolution
mechanism (principle 6: conflict resolution mechanism). In
addition, government not only recognize the right to form village
level organizations, but also encourage the farmers to organize
(principle 7: minimal recognition of right to organize). And, as
mentioned in ch. 2, Saemaul Undong activities are organized in
multiple layers of nested enterprises (principle 8: nested
enterprises). But, there is no monitoring and sanction mechanism
(principle 3 and 4). The reason for the absence of these
mechanisms may be, I guess, the provision of infrastructure is
"fence", while CPR situation is "trap" (see Messick and Brewer
1983). Moreover, according to them, provision of public good is
"no-delay collective fence", which is relatively easy-to-solve.
Maybe that is why Saemaul Undong can be successful without them.
But, despite of remarkable success in 1970's, Saemaul Undong was
fragile rather than robust (see Ostrom 1990). It is probably
because farmers have no control over the exogenous factors which
have crucial impacts on the game. Even though Saemaul Undong
activities are organized in multiple layers of nested
enterprises, these organizations are highly centralized and out
of the reach of farmers. Based on this fact, I think, we can
think of one more principle: veto mechanism, especially in the
highly centralized political system.
2. Veto Mechanism:
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As Herzberg and Ostrom (1980) maintain, in democratic
political system, there exists the possibility that majority
exploits minority. In particular, in case where minorities have
extremely serious problem but their interest cannot be
represented because of their number, we need veto mechanism. It
refers to some formal mechanism of rejecting what is decided in
democratic way such as majority rule, but seriously threatens
minority's interests due to some external factors.
Saemaul Undong can be summarized as an effort to increase
rural income through the creation of productive bases - physical
infrastructure. By encouraging provision of rural
infrastructure, government wants to achieve ultimate gaol: income
increase in rural sector. To achieve this gaol, we need one more
policy tool - high-rice-price policy, and government employed
that policy in 1970's for whatever reason. By 1979 when the goal
of sufficiency in food was achieved, government gave up high-
rice-price policy and allowed import of agricultural products.
This changes were inevitable because of (i) the accumulation of
finance deficit and inflatory pressure due to high-rice-price
policy; and (ii) the increasing pressure to open domestic market.
It was uncontrollable factor for both farmers and the government.
But, more importantly, in this drastically changing socio-
economic conditions, farmer have no way to represent their
interests. According to Korean "Law of Government Organization",
local government refers to agencies whose jurisdiction affects
local territories. No local government is political unit able to
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make autonomous political decisions on the basis of constituency
power (Aqua 1974; Kim 1985). In addition, the members of Korean
National Assembly, by the Constitution, are supposed to represent
not their constituency but the whole Nation. It means that
Korean farmers have no way to represent their interests or veto
some decision which jeopardizes even their survival. In action
situation, they do have collective choice arena, the village
General Meeting, where they can change rules affecting their
actions. However, the village is not an administrative unit
which can decide or suggest some rule change (Steinberg 1984).
Saemaul leaders are also not allowed to be involved in formal
decision making process concerning agricultural policies, even
though they get formal training from the government. Recently,
as a result, farmers began to form somewhat radical and national-
level organization and exercise their veto power in informal ways
such as political protest, mass demonstration (Kim 1987; Chang
1987). These efforts are, however, not recognized by the
government. In sum, to overcome crisis comes from the
uncontrollable, we need veto mechanism with which players can
refuse to admit uncontrollable parameters jeopardizing even their
subsistence.
V. CONCLUSION
Most scholars agree that Saemaul Undong in 1970's was
successful due to the Saemaul leaders and the government's
efforts through the Village Classification System, Saemaul
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Leaders Training Institute (Kim 1985; KIOS 1977; Yu et al. 1980;
Yu 1980; Rho 1977; Park 1974). This is the case in the sense
that these two have succeeded in sustaining voluntary cooperation
among the farmers. Korean government provided necessary
information for the farmers through Saemaul leaders, Saemaul
leaders, in turn, informed their neighbors of the necessary
information and the best feasible strategies. After initiation,
government's supports, based on the level of farmers cooperative
efforts, were successful in providing strong and efficient
incentives for the farmers, accordingly farmers did cooperate
both actively and voluntarily.
In conclusion, let me briefly discuss about some problems.
First, the problem of getting to cooperation in the first place.
Formal theory cannot give us an answer. But, as we can see,
there exist many cooperative collective actions. In our case, we
can say that cooperation was initiated through both dedication of
Saemaul leaders and the strong family and kinship ties of rural
villages. Because of these factors, we can assume that players
will employ "nice" strategy - which means starting with
cooperation, and we can infer the relationship between
parameters. Based on this inference, I maintain that government
support rate can be an effective policy tool under several
conditions. But, the effectiveness is eventually dependent on
the parameters such as K,
 i and which is unique to villages.
If we assume that such parameters can be more easily perceived by
the lower level government, we can say that central government's
23
capability to decide appropriate policy tools, such as government
support rate in our case, may be extremely limited. In
transition period, especially, it is likely to make serious
mistakes, either intentionally or unintentionally, without a
proper way of representing minority interests. This is the
problem of interposing a veto. Brennan and Buchanan maintain
that "good games depend on good rules more than they depend on
good players" (1985, 150). That may be the case. But, I think,
whether rules of the game is good or not is decided by whether
these rules are under the control of the players or not. And,
accordingly, good games depend on whether or not rules are under
the control of the players.
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